Effects of sampling interaction partners and competitors in evolutionary
  games by Hauert, Christoph & Miȩkisz, Jacek
Effects of sampling interaction partners and competitors in evolutionary games
Christoph Hauert1 and Jacek Mie¸kisz2
1Department of Mathematics, The University of British Columbia,
1984 Mathematics Road, Vancouver, B.C., Canada, V6T 1Z2
2Institute of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics,
University of Warsaw, Banacha 2, 02-097 Warsaw, Poland
(Dated: November 20, 2018)
The sampling of interaction partners depends on often implicit modelling assumptions, yet has
marked effects on the dynamics in evolutionary games. One particularly important aspect is whether
or not competitors also interact. Population structures naturally affect sampling such that in a mi-
croscopic interpretation of the replicator dynamics in well-mixed populations competing individuals
do not interact but do interact in structured populations. In social dilemmas interactions with
competitors invariably inhibit cooperation while limited local interactions in structured populations
support cooperation by reducing exploitation through cluster formation. These antagonistic effects
of population structures on cooperation affect interpretations and the conclusions depend on the
details of the comparison. For example, in the Snowdrift game, spatial structure may inhibit co-
operation when compared to the replicator dynamics. However, modifying the replicator dynamics
to include interactions between competitors lowers the equilibrium frequency of cooperators, which
changes the conclusions and space is invariably beneficial, just as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. These
conclusions are confirmed by comparisons with random matching models, which mimic population
structures but randomly reshuffle individuals to inhibit spatial correlations. Finally, the differences
in the dynamics with and without interactions among competing individuals underlies the differences
between death-birth and birth-death updating in the spatial Moran process: death-birth supports
cooperation because competitors tend not to interact whereas they tend to do for birth-death up-
dating and hence cooperators provide direct support to competitors to their own detriment.
PACS numbers: 87.23.-n, 89.65.-s 02.50.Ey
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation between unrelated individuals in ani-
mal and human societies is an intriguing issue in biol-
ogy and social sciences [1–5]. In the Darwinian world
of survival of the fittest, altruistic behaviour that is
costly to the individual and benefits others should
be selected against, yet cooperation is ubiquitous in
nature. Cooperation represents a social dilemma be-
cause everyone is better off cooperating but each indi-
vidual is tempted to free-ride on the benefits created
by others, which creates a conflict of interest between
the group and the individual [6]. This fundamental
challenge in behavioural sciences can be addressed
with evolutionary game theory where the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, the Snowdrift game or the Stag-hunt game
represent different instances and variants of the un-
derlying social dilemma [7].
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma cooperators pay a cost,
c, to provide a benefit, b, to their interaction partner
(b > c), while defectors neither incur costs nor provide
benefits. If two cooperators meet they mutually bene-
fit from the interaction but both participants face the
temptation to defect and avoid the costs of coopera-
tion. However, if both participants choose to defect
neither one gains anything from this interaction. The
Prisoner’s Dilemma represents to most stringent form
of a social dilemma. In order to maintain cooperative
behaviour, positive assortment among cooperators is
required [8], i.e. cooperators must more likely inter-
act with other cooperators than in random encoun-
ters. The necessary assortment of cooperators, or,
more precisely, of acts of cooperation can be achieved
through various mechanisms, including conditional re-
sponse in repeated interactions through direct or indi-
rect reciprocity [9–12] or through limited local interac-
tions in spatially structured populations [13, 14]. In
particular, population structures impose constraints
on the sampling of interaction partners. These con-
straints not only affect an individual’s fitness by re-
stricting interactions to a subset of the entire popu-
lation but also limit its exposure to individuals with
alternative strategies that could be imitated or whose
offspring might displace the individual. More specif-
ically, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, population struc-
tures facilitate assortment by enabling cooperators to
form clusters and thereby reducing exploitation from
defection.
The Snowdrift game relaxes the social dilemma to
the extent that cooperators and defectors can co-exist
in the absence of assortment [15]. The name of the
game refers to the situation where two drivers on their
way home are trapped on either side of a snowdrift.
If both cooperate and start shovelling they both get
the benefit of getting home while splitting the costs
for clearing the way, b − c/2. However, if only one
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2shovels both still get the benefit but the cooperator
bears the full costs. Finally if no one shovels no one
gets anywhere. In contrast to the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
the best strategy now depends on the opponent: if the
other cooperates it is better to defect, as before, but if
the other defects it is better to cooperate and get b−c
instead of nothing for mutual defection. Note that the
Snowdrift game turns into a Prisoner’s Dilemma for
large costs, c > b, and for even larger costs, c > 2b, co-
operation is no longer a viable strategy, the dilemma
disappears and defection becomes the mutually pre-
ferred strategy.
Formally, the Snowdrift game is equivalent to the
chicken or Hawk-Dove game [16] but provides an inter-
pretation in terms of cooperation rather than conflict
and competition. Interestingly, the effects of assort-
ment and spatial structure, in particular, on cooper-
ation in the Snowdrift game [17] are not as clear-cut
as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In particular, the con-
clusion whether spatial structure promotes or inhibits
cooperation depends on the details of the reference
setup and ultimately on the sampling of interaction
partners and competitors.
Finally, the Stag-hunt game is an instance of a co-
ordination game where the best strategy also depends
on the opponent but this time it is best to do the
same as the opponent. The Stag-hunt game is inspired
by Rousseau’s social contract [18] noting that hunting
a stag requires the concerted cooperative efforts of a
hunting party but each hunter faces the temptation
defect and catch a hare instead. Although the hare
feeds the hunter, doing so spoils the group’s efforts to
bag the preferred stag. In this case, the conflict of
interest reduces to a coordination game because even
though both players prefer mutual cooperation, they
may get trapped in states of mutual defection because
neither party has an incentive to (unilaterally) switch
strategy.
Here we consider the effects of sampling individu-
als for interaction and competition on the evolution-
ary dynamics and, in particular, on cooperation in so-
cial dilemmas. More specifically, we consider sampling
in well-mixed, i.e. unstructured populations, for the
classical, deterministic replicator dynamics [19, 20] as
well as stochastic finite population models [21, 22]
and compare the dynamics to random-matching mod-
els [23–25] as well as structured population models
[14, 26].
II. SAMPLING IN INFINITE POPULATIONS
The replicator dynamics [19, 20, 27] describes evo-
lutionary changes in infinite populations that consist
of d strategic types with frequencies xi for i = 1, . . . , d:
x˙i = xi(fi − f¯), (1)
where fi denotes the average fitness of type i de-
rived from random interactions with other members
of the unstructured (well-mixed) population and f¯ =∑d
i=1 xifi indicates the average fitness of the popu-
lation. Naturally
∑d
i=1 xi = 1 must hold and hence
the dynamics unfolds on the simplex Sd. Equation (1)
states that any strategic type, which performs better
than the population on average, increases in abun-
dance. More specifically, the fitness fi reflects the pay-
offs achieved in interactions with other members of the
population. If interactions occur randomly and among
pairs of individuals (as opposed to larger groups), the
payoffs are given by a matrix A = [aij ], where the el-
ement aij indicates the payoff of an individual of type
i interacting with an individual of type j. In that case
the replicator equation can be written in matrix form
x˙i = xi((Ax)i − xAx), (2)
with fi = (Ax)i, f¯ = xAx and x = (x1, . . . , xd)
denoting the current state of the population.
From a microscopic perspective, the evolutionary
dynamics unfolds in two stages: First, all individu-
als interact with other members of the population by
playing games and receiving payoffs according to the
payoff matrix A, which then affects and determines
their fitness. Second, individuals compete for repro-
duction and succeed at rates (or probabilities) propor-
tional to their fitness, which changes the composition
of the population, x. Together the two stages result
in a Darwinian process based on variation (differences
in traits) and selection (differences in fitness). In a
cultural context, the population composition changes
if individuals preferentially imitate or learn strategies
of more successful types, i.e. those that have a higher
fitness fi. Similarly, in a biological (genetic) context,
the population composition changes through differen-
tial reproduction rates, again represented by the fit-
ness fi, where offspring replace other members of the
population. The replicator equation, Eq. (1), repre-
sents the infinite population limit of either process
[22, 28, 29].
The fitness fi in Eq. (1) is determined by the pay-
offs of an individual of type i when interacting with
other members of the population in state x. If each
individual interacts with k randomly chosen partners,
then there are, on average, kxi interaction partners of
type i, see Fig. 1a. For fi based on average payoffs,
fi = (A(kx))i/k = (Ax)i, the matrix form Eq. (2) is
recovered and the average fitness remains unaffected
by the number of interactions k. Only the variance
of the fitness between individuals of the same type in-
creases for small k and vanishes for k → ∞ but in
infinite populations this has no effect on the evolu-
tionary dynamics.
Implicit in the conclusion that the dynamic is in-
dependent of k is the assumption that the focal and
3a b c
FIG. 1. Sampling of interaction partners in well-mixed (a and b) and spatially structured populations (c). a The two
competitors (red and blue) each interact with a random sample of k = 4 other members of the population (light red
and light blue, respectively). b The two competitors interact with each other plus k − 1 = 3 random members of the
population. c In spatially structured populations competitors are always neighbours and interact with each other as well
as their other neighbours, some of which may be shared depending on the underlying geometry.
model individual do not interact and hence assumes
that no correlation exists between interactions and
competition. However, if the two competitors, the
focal and model individual, do interact and only the
remaining (k − 1) interaction partners are randomly
sampled, then a focal individual of type i and a model
of type j have, on average, fitness
fi =
(k − 1)(A(x))i + aij
k
(3a)
fj =
(k − 1)(A(x))j + aji
k
, (3b)
respectively, see Fig. 1b. Clearly, the effects of sam-
pling on fitness vanish in the limit k → ∞ and are
strongest for small k, such that for k = 1 individuals
exclusively interact with their current competitor.
The replicator dynamics Eq. (1) is recovered for
pairwise comparison processes where a focal individ-
ual u compares its payoff to a model individual v [22].
In a cultural context, the focal individual adopts the
model’s strategy at a rate proportional to their payoff
difference fv − fu, whereas, in a genetic context, the
focal individual gets displaced by (clonal) offspring
of the model. Suppose pi→j is the rate at which an
individual of type i adopts the strategy of (or gets dis-
placed by) an individual of type j. Then the rate of
change of the frequency of type i is given by
x˙i =
d∑
j=1
xixjpj→i −
d∑
j=1
xixjpi→j
= xi
d∑
j=1
xj (pj→i − pi→j) . (4)
If the rates pj→i are linear functions of the payoff dif-
ferences, fi − fj , then Eq. (4) recovers the replicator
dynamics, Eq. (1). For example, this applies for the
pairwise comparison process given by
pj→i =
1
2
+
ω
2
(fi − fj), (5)
where ω ≥ 0 indicates the selection strength. For
ω = 0 selection is absent and the process is neu-
tral, whereas for large ω even small fitness differences
translate to large selective advantages. ω  1 refers
to the important limit of weak selection. This yields
x˙i = ωxi(fi − f¯), which is the same as Eq. (1) except
for a constant rescaling of time by ω. Hence the net
effect of changing the selection strength is a change
in the time scale of the replicator dynamics. Often it
is useful to interpret pj→i as transition probabilities
in which case an upper bound, ωmax, exists to ensure
that pj→i remains confined to [0, 1].
A. 2× 2 games
In order to highlight the differences in dynamics
due to the sampling process, consider pairwise inter-
actions, two strategies, A andB, and the generic, sym-
metric payoff matrix
(A B
A α β
B γ δ
)
. (6)
The replicator equation, Eq. (1), then reduces to
x˙ = x
(
fA − f¯
)
= x(1− x) (fA − fB) (7)
where x denotes the frequency of type A individuals.
The dynamics admits two trivial equilibria at x = 0
and x = 1 plus possibly a third, interior equilibrium,
x∗, for which fA = fB holds. The existence and lo-
cation of x∗ depends on the sampling process to se-
lect interaction partners for type A and B individuals,
4which then determines fA and fB , respectively. If all
k interaction partners are randomly sampled the inte-
rior equilibrium is given by
x∗ =
δ − β
α− β − γ + δ , (8)
provided that 0 < x∗ < 1 and is independent of
k. Moreover, the interior equilibrium is invariant to
adding constants to columns in the payoff matrix,
which is a consequence of the corresponding invariance
of the replicator dynamics, Eq. (1). Consequently the
generic dynamics can be effectively reduced to two
instead of four parameters (payoffs) [30] but this gen-
erally does not extend to other dynamics or popu-
lation structures. Naturally, Eq. (8) also represents
the mixed Nash equilibrium of the game, Eq. (6).
However, if competing individuals always interact (see
Eq. (3)) then, for k ≥ 2, the interior equilibrium is
shifted to
x∗k = x
∗ − 1
k − 1
β − γ
α− β − γ + δ . (9)
The shift solely originates in the choice of sampling
scheme to determine the fitness of A and B type in-
dividuals. Moreover, the interior equilibrium, x∗k, no
longer preserves the invariance of x∗ and hence the
generic dynamics now relies on three payoffs (one can
still be absorbed in a rescaling of time). In the limit
k →∞ the differences vanish and x∗k → x∗. For k = 1
the fitness of an individual is exclusively determined
by the interaction with its competitor and the repli-
cator equation (7) reduces to
x˙ = x(1− x) (β − γ) (10)
and hence no interior equilibrium exists regardless of
the game. In fact, any game is reduced to a purely
competitive interaction – if A outperforms B (β > γ)
then A-types keep increasing and x = 1 is the only
stable state. The converse holds if B outperforms A
(β < γ) and A-types dwindle and disappear.
In the following we focus on canonical forms of so-
cial dilemmas involving only one or two parameters
(payoffs) while maintaining the characteristic and rep-
resentative features of the interaction.
1. Prisoner’s Dilemma
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is characterized by the pay-
off ranking γ > α > δ > β, which ensures that B
(defection) dominates A (cooperation) and the third
equilibrium x∗ does not exist. The donation game [4]
outlined in the introduction is a popular instance of
the Prisoner’s Dilemma
( C D
C b− c −c
D b 0
)
, (11)
which can be re-scaled and reduced to a single pa-
rameter interaction based on the cost-to-benefit ra-
tion r = c/b. Moreover, the donation game satisfies
equal-gains-from-switching [31], γ − α = β − δ, and
hence renders the replicator dynamics frequency in-
dependent. The modified sampling scheme yields
x˙ = x(1− x)
(
−c− 1
k
b
)
. (12)
Changing the sampling scheme only rescales time but
does not affect the outcome – cooperators remain
doomed and actually disappear even faster for de-
creasing k.
2. Snowdrift game
The characteristic payoff ranking of the Snowdrift
game is very similar with γ > α > β > δ, i.e. only the
last inequality is reversed, which renders A (coopera-
tion) attractive when facing B (defection) and conse-
quentially admits a globally stable interior fixed point
x∗. Traditionally the Snowdrift game is parametrized
as
( C D
C b− c2 b− c
D b 0
)
, (13)
with b > c > 0 such that x∗ = 1 − r with the cost-
to-benefit ratio of mutual cooperation r = c/(2b− c).
Thus, if cooperation is cheap, c b, most individuals
cooperate at equilibrium, whereas if it is expensive,
c . b, few cooperators persist. Regardless of costs
and benefits, the equilibrium state is always a sta-
ble mixture of cooperators and defectors. This is no
longer the case when changing the sampling scheme to
always include the competing individual. For k ≥ 2
this shifts the equilibrium to
x∗k = 1−
k + 1
k − 1r = x
∗ − 2
k − 1r (14)
and hence invariably lowers the fraction of cooperators
at equilibrium. In particular, this change introduces a
threshold rc = (k−1)/(k+1) above which cooperation
is no longer sustainable, see Fig. 2a & b.
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FIG. 2. Equilibrium fraction of cooperators in well-mixed
populations interacting in the Snowdrift game, x∗ (dashed
line) and x∗k (dash-dotted line) for k = 4, as a func-
tion of the cost-to-benefit ratio r compared to individual
based simulations () for N = 104 and selection strength
ω = 0.01. a random sampling of interaction partners
matches x∗ even close to 0 or 1 indicating that for N = 104
stochastic fluctuations, which may result in the extinction
or fixation of cooperators, are negligible. b modified sam-
pling scheme to include the competitor among the inter-
action partners matches x∗k and is consistently lower than
x∗. Above rc = (k − 1)/(k + 1) = 3/5 cooperators can no
longer persist.
3. Stag-hunt game
The Stag-hunt game is an instance of a coordination
game characterized by the payoff ranking α > γ ≥ δ >
β such that it is always best to choose the same strat-
egy as the opponent. The traditional parametrization
of the Stag-hunt game is given by the payoff matrix:
(C D
C 1 0
D a a
)
, (15)
where the value of a stag is conveniently normalized to
1 and a hare is worth 1 > a > 0. Similar to the Snow-
drift game, the Stag-hunt game also admits an interior
fixed point x∗ = a but now x∗ is unstable and the two
trivial equilibria x = 0 and x = 1 are both stable.
Consequently, x∗ also marks the basin of attraction
for each of the two stable, homogeneous equilibria.
In populations with x > x∗ the frequency of coop-
erators keeps increasing while decreasing if x < x∗.
If x∗ > 1/2 then defection is risk dominant (has the
larger basin of attraction) and if x∗ < 1/2 cooperation
is risk dominant but in either case mutual cooperation
is the preferred, or efficient, outcome [32, 33]. Hence
cooperation is risk dominant as long as hares are lean
and worth less than half a stag, a < 1/2.
Changing the sampling scheme to always include
the competing individual shifts the separating equi-
librium to
x∗k =
k
k − 1a = x
∗ +
1
k − 1a (16)
for k ≥ 2 and hence consistently increases the basin
of attraction of defection. For k(1− a) ≤ 1 (including
k = 1) the basin of attraction of efficient cooperation
disappears and defection remains the sole globally sta-
ble equilibrium.
B. Structured populations
In structured populations individuals do not ran-
domly interact with any other member of the popula-
tion but rather interactions are confined to an individ-
ual’s neighbourhood as defined by a graph structure
where each vertex represents an individual and edges
reflect interactions. Consequently, the fitness of indi-
viduals is stochastic and based on the particular real-
ization of the strategies in their neighbourhood rather
than expected payoffs as in Eq. (1) or Eq. (4).
As before, individuals update their strategies based
on probabilistic comparisons of their fitness with the
fitness of other members of the population but now
the pool of competitors is restricted to an individ-
ual’s neighbourhood. This generates positive assort-
ment among both strategic types through cluster for-
mation, which benefits cooperators in social dilemmas
by increasing interactions with other cooperators [8].
However, clusters can only expand along their periph-
ery where cooperators are pitched against defectors
to their disadvantage. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma the
benefits of assortment prevail and prevent the extinc-
tion of cooperation. The spatial arrangement reduces
exploitation by defectors and hence enables coopera-
tors and defectors to coexist [26]. In contrast, in the
Snowdrift game spatial structure may both enhance or
inhibit cooperation [17] when compared to the equilib-
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FIG. 3. Equilibrium fraction of cooperators in structured
populations interacting in the Snowdrift game as a func-
tion of the cost-to-benefit ratio r from individual based
simulations () with selection strength ω = 0.01. As a ref-
erence the equilibrium of the replicator dynamics is shown
for the standard sampling scheme, x∗ (dashed line), as well
as for the modified sampling scheme x∗k (dash-dotted line)
with k = 4. a lattice population (N = 100 × 100) inter-
acting with the four nearest neighbours (k = 4). Com-
pared to x∗, spatial structure turns out to be detrimental
to cooperation for larger r, however, compared to x∗k spa-
tial structure remains beneficial. b random regular graph
with four neighbours (N = 104, k = 4) results in equilib-
rium frequencies of cooperators between the lattice and x∗
due to the decrease in ordered structure and hence local
clustering.
rium fraction in the replicator dynamics, see Fig. 3a.
When comparing interactions and updating in well-
mixed and spatial games then the spatial structure
obviously restricts the interaction partners of each in-
dividual to a small subset of the population but for
pairwise comparison processes it also imposes that
competing neighbours interact with each other at least
with high probability. Consequently, it may be more
appropriate to compare the effect of spatial structure
to a well-mixed population where the two competi-
tors interact as well. This corresponds to the fitness
according to Eq. (3), which lowers the equilibrium fre-
quency of cooperators in the Snowdrift game, Eq. (14).
Using this scenario as a reference it turns out that spa-
tial structure also invariably benefits cooperation, see
Fig. 3b.
1. Moran process
Note, this relates to broader patterns observed in
the spatial Moran process [34]. The original Moran
process [35, 36] represents a stochastic birth-death
process to model evolution in finite, well-mixed pop-
ulations. Individuals are selected to reproduce with
a probability proportional to their fitness. Their off-
spring inherits the strategic type of the parent and
replaces a randomly selected member of the popula-
tion. As a consequence the overall population size, N ,
remains constant and only the numbers of each strate-
gic type changes. The dynamics in well-mixed pop-
ulations is essentially indifferent to whether birth or
death events are processed first [37]. More specifically,
it is intuitive that the differences are of order 1/N be-
cause the essential distinction between the birth-death
and death-birth scenario is that the latter reduces the
number of potential parents to N − 1. In the limit
of large populations, N → ∞, the Moran process re-
covers the adjusted replicator dynamics [22]. The ad-
justed replicator dynamics [38] rescales time propor-
tional to 1/f¯ (the inverse of the average population
fitness) such that changes happen fast in poorly per-
forming populations but slower in populations that
are well off but exhibits the same equilibria as the
(standard) replicator dynamics, Eq. (1).
2. Birth-death and death-birth processes
Interestingly, this is strikingly different in spa-
tially structured populations: death-birth updates are
significantly stronger promoters of cooperation than
birth-death updates in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In
particular, in the limit of weak selection, spatial struc-
ture provides no support to cooperators for birth-
death updating and cooperation remains doomed just
as in well-mixed populations. However, for death-
birth updating cooperators can thrive provided the
benefits exceed the k-fold costs, b > ck, where k de-
notes the (average) number of interaction partners of
each individual, i.e. the degree of the graph [13].
Intuitively, the reasons for this difference lie in the
fact that for birth-death updates interaction partners
tend to also compete with each other, whereas they
7tend not to for death-birth updates. In the first case
this clearly puts cooperators at a disadvantage be-
cause they directly assist their competitors. For birth-
death updating competition for reproduction is global
and hence includes the interaction partners of a fo-
cal cooperator. In contrast, for death-birth updating
competition is local because only the neighbours of a
vacant site compete and they tend not to be neigh-
bours themselves. The complementary conclusion is
obtained if selection acts on death rather than birth,
i.e. if individuals with a higher fitness live longer.
Now the birth-death process supports cooperation be-
cause competition is local and the individuals compet-
ing for survival tend not to be interaction partners as
well [39]. More generally, what matters is the scale of
competition or, more precisely, the overlap between
competitors and interaction partners – the more dis-
joint the two sets are, the better for cooperators.
In the spatial Snowdrift game, the interplay be-
tween birth-death or death-birth updating and effects
of population structure are more subtle, see Fig. 4.
Note that in the Moran process fluctuations are signif-
icantly larger than for pairwise comparison processes
and hence absorption times are shorter. As a conse-
quence, the equilibrium frequencies in simulations are
averaged over multiple runs to reduce the effects of ab-
sorption in either homogeneous state of all cooperators
or all defectors. Systematic deviations between ana-
lytical predictions in the weak selection limit and the
simulations result from the finite selection strength as
well as from the lattice structure. Deviations decrease
for simulations on random regular graphs, which bet-
ter reflect the assumptions of pair approximation.
For death-birth updating competitors tend not to
interact but the details depend on the population
structure. Two extremes are random regular graphs
where neighbours do not interact in the limit N →∞
whereas on a lattice with Moore neighbourhood (k =
8) some neighbours interact with up to half of the
neighbourhood of the vacant site. For lattices with
von Neumann neighbourhood (k = 4) neighbours do
not interact but remain close because they share half
of their interaction partners. The case where competi-
tors do not interact corresponds to the standard sam-
pling in well-mixed populations, Eq. (8). Pair approx-
imation and simulation results both confirm that spa-
tial structure consistently increases the equilibrium
frequency of cooperation, see Fig. 4a.
Conversely, for birth-death updating competitors
do interact and hence corresponds to the modified
sampling in well-mixed populations, Eq. (9). Again,
pair approximation and simulations confirms that spa-
tial structure invariably increases cooperation, see
Fig. 4b. However, as in Fig. 3b, comparisons to the
standard sampling conclude that spatial structure is
beneficial only at small r and becomes detrimental at
high r. The essential difference between birth-death
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FIG. 4. Equilibrium fraction of cooperators in the spa-
tial Moran process for the Snowdrift game as a function
of the cost-to-benefit ratio r from individual based simu-
lations (•, standard deviation as error bars) for a death-
birth updating and b birth-death updating with selection
strength ω = 0.01 on a N = 100 × 100 lattice with four
nearest neighbours (k = 4). The simulation results are av-
eraged over 100 runs each, relaxed over 5000 generations
and then taking the mean and standard deviation over
the next 5000 generations. The equilibria for the Moran
process in well-mixed populations in the limit N → ∞
are the same as for the replicator dynamics for standard
sampling (grey dashed line). Accounting for the fact that
competitors also interact for birth-death updating recov-
ers modified sampling (grey dash-dotted line). For the
spatial Moran process the equilibria are derived from pair
approximation in the limit of weak selection, ω  1, for
birth-death updating (black dashed line) and death-birth
updating (dash-dotted line).
and death-birth updating in structured populations
can be captured in well-mixed populations by adjust-
ing the sampling scheme to mimic the respective over-
lap between interaction partners and competitors.
8III. RANDOM-MATCHING MODELS
Random-matching models represents a well-mixed
analogue to interactions on regular graphs with de-
gree k [23, 24]. In every time step individuals are ar-
ranged on a random regular graph, interact with their
neighbours and a focal individual updates its strategy
through a probabilistic payoff comparison with a ran-
domly selected neighbour. Thus, the fitness is stochas-
tic just as in structured populations but the redistri-
bution of players between updates prevents clustering
and destroys any spatial correlations while preserv-
ing all other aspects of the dynamical updating. This
scheme naturally implements the modified sampling
scheme, which includes interactions between focal and
model individuals, and is therefore the default in ran-
dom matching models.
A. Infinite-population limit
The composition of the population changes only if
two individuals with different strategic types meet and
probabilistically compare their payoffs. As before, let
us focus on the simplest case of 2× 2 games with two
strategic types A and B, Eq. (6). In infinite popula-
tions, the probability that two individuals of different
type meet and compete is x(1 − x), where x denotes
the frequency of the A type. For each individual this
leaves an additional k−1 randomly chosen interaction
partners to determine their respective fitness. The
number of A types among those follows a binomial
distribution such that
p(m) =
(
k − 1
m
)
xm(1− x)k−1−m (17)
denotes the probability that m of the k− 1 co-players
are of type A. Thus, the probability that a type B
individual imitates and switches to type A, or equiv-
alently, gets displaced by offspring of the A type, is
given by
pB→A =
1
2
+
ω
2
k−1∑
a=0
k−1∑
b=0
p(a)p(b)×(
aα+ (k − a)β − b γ + (k − b)δ
)
(18)
=
1
2
+
ω
2
(
β − γ + (k − 1)×
(β − δ + x(α− β − γ + δ))
)
, (19)
where the summations over a, b indicate the number
of A types among the k − 1 interaction partners of
the focal A and B type, respectively. The converse
probability, pA→B , reduces to
pA→B =
1
2
− ω
2
(
β − γ + (k − 1)×
(β − δ + x(α− β − γ + δ))
)
, (20)
such that pA→B + pB→A = 1 holds [25].
An interior stationary state of the random match-
ing dynamics is, if it exists, given by pA→B = pB→A,
such that the probability of an increase in A types
equals that of an increase in B types. Because of
pA→B+pB→A = 1 both have to be 1/2. The resulting
equilibrium turns out to be the same as for the mod-
ified sampling, x∗k, Eq. (9). Decoupling interaction
and competition of individuals through standard sam-
pling shifts the interior stationary state to x∗, Eq. (8),
provided it exists, and random matching recovers the
equilibria of the standard replicator dynamics. If the
interior stationary state is unstable, as in coordina-
tion games, or in the absence of an interior stationary
state, the dynamics drives the population to either
one of the absorbing homogeneous states with all A
or all B types. Thus, in the infinite-population limit,
both replicator dynamics and random-matching mod-
els give rise to the same long-run behaviour [24].
B. Stochastic stability in finite populations
In finite well-mixed populations of constant size, N ,
the state of the population is fully determined by the
number of each strategic type and, more specifically,
in the present case of 2×2 games by the number of A
types. A state is called stochastically stable if it has a
non-zero probability in the zero-noise limit of the sta-
tionary probability distribution [40]. More precisely,
this limit considers update rules where the strategy of
individuals with higher fitness is always adopted (or,
equivalently, the offspring of the fitter individual al-
ways succeeds in replacing the less fit) regardless of
the magnitude of the fitness difference. Occasionally,
with a small probability, , an error happens and an
inferior strategy is nevertheless adopted or a superior
one is not. Note, we assume   1/N to disentangle
errors and probabilities for rare comparisons between
different strategic types. For the pairwise comparison
update, Eq. (5), these assumptions correspond to the
limit ω →∞ while adding a noise term:
pj→i = + (1− 2)Θ(fi − fj), (21)
where Θ(x) denotes the Heaviside step function. With
this updating the population eventually ends up in
one of the absorbing homogeneous states with either
all individuals of type A or B. In order to pre-
vent absorption, a small probability, µ, is introduced
9with which mutations arise and an individual sponta-
neously switches to the opposite strategy. This turns
the population dynamics into an ergodic process with
a unique stationary probability distribution, which
can interpreted as the fraction of time that the popu-
lation spends in the corresponding state [41]. For sim-
plicity, we set µ =  and determine stochastic stability
in the limit → 0 for different sampling schemes, see
appendix A. For dominance games, such as the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma, stochastic stability and stability in
infinite populations always coincide and do not de-
pend on the sampling scheme. However, interesting
differences arise for the Stag-hunt game, Eq. (15), and
the Snowdrift game, Eq. (13), because of the bi-stable
and co-existence dynamics, respectively.
1. Stag-hunt game
A crucial determinant of the evolutionary trajec-
tory in the Stag-hunt game, Eq. (15), is the basin of
attraction of the two absorbing states of homogeneous
cooperation or defection. The size of the two basins
is determined by the location of the unstable inte-
rior fixed point, x∗ = a for standard sampling, and
x∗k = ak/(k − 1) for the modified sampling, Eq. (16).
The strategy with the larger basin of attraction is
called risk-dominant. For Eq. (15) and standard sam-
pling this means that C is risk-dominant for a < 1/2
while D is risk-dominant for a > 1/2. Similarly, C
is risk-dominant for a < (k − 1)/(2k) for the modi-
fied sampling and D is risk-dominant for the reverse
inequality.
In the replicator dynamics, the evolutionary end
state is simply determined by the chance with which
the initial configuration falls into one or the other
basin of attraction. In contrast, for the stochastic dy-
namics in finite populations, the only stochastically
stable state is a homogeneous population with all in-
dividuals adopting the risk-dominant strategy [33, 42].
Intuitively, stochastic stability is determined by the
number of rare events, i.e. transitions with probabil-
ity o(), that are required to switch from one homoge-
neous state to the other, stochastic stability requires
 1/N because otherwise many more transitions be-
come relevant. Naturally, the one requiring fewer rare
events to reach dominates and is therefore stochasti-
cally stable, see appendix A. More specifically, for the
Stag-hunt game we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 1 In the Stag-hunt game, Eq. (15), the ho-
mogeneous state with all cooperators, C, is stochasti-
cally stable under random matching if
a < max
i=1,...,k
min{ i− 1
k
, 1− i
k
},
while the homogeneous state with all defectors, D, is
stochastically stable if
a > min
i=1,...,k
max{ i− 1
k
, 1− i
k
}.
The proof is provided in appendix B. Note that for
even k, the second inequality reduces to a > 1/2.
From the theorem follows that C is stochastically sta-
ble, for example, for k = 4 if a < 1/4 and D is stochas-
tically stable if a > 1/2, while for 1/4 ≤ a ≤ 1/2 the
stationary probability mass is split among the C and
D states and hence both are stochastically stable, see
Fig. 5b.
In order to highlight the effects of sampling, let
us now consider a random-matching model without
interactions between focal and model individuals by
randomly choosing the model from the entire popu-
lation and not just from interaction partners of the
focal individual. Note that this change does not af-
fect the derivation of the stochastic payoffs. Inter-
estingly, changing the sampling leaves the conditions
for stochastic stability unchanged but this is not re-
flected in numerical results, see Fig. 5a. It turns out
that the dynamics in the region 1/4 < a < 1/2 for
k = 4 is more subtle and is not only constrained by
rare events based on the error probability  but also
by events of the order 1/N2 and 1/N3.
In the Stag-hunt game, the rare type is always at a
disadvantage and hence the probability that the num-
ber of C-players increases from one to two, 1 → 2, is
of order o() regardless of a. Now consider the tran-
sition 2→ 3 with k = 4: in the best scenario for C, a
C-player interacts with the other C-player (plus 3 D-
players) and receives a payoff of 1 while competes with
a D-player who gets a payoff of 4a regardless of its in-
teraction partners. Thus, for a > 1/4 the transition
remains of order o(). More interesting is the tran-
sition 3 → 4: again, in the best scenario a C-player
interacts with both C-players (plus 2 D-players) and
receives a payoff of 2 such that now the transition is
viable for a < 1/2. However, this best scenario occurs
only with probability of the order 1/N2 and hence
makes a significant contribution only if  < 1/N2.
Analogous arguments apply if D-players are rare
and C-players common. The transition from a single
D to two D’s, or N − 1 → N − 2 C-players, and
from N − 2 → N − 3 are viable for a > 3/4 and a >
1/2, respectively, in the best scenario for the D-player.
More interestingly, the transition N − 3 → N − 4 is
viable for a > 1/4, in the best scenario but this occurs
only with probability of the order 1/N3 based on the
probability that the C competitor has interacted with
all D-players in the population.
Comparing the transitions 3 → 4 and N − 3 →
N − 4 C-players, we note that for 1/4 < a < 1/2,
the former transition is more likely by a factor of 1/N
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and hence for small  and large N (more precisely,  >
1/N2), almost all probability mass is concentrated at
C even though D is, in principle, stochastically stable
too. For larger N , with  < 1/N2, the result remains
unchanged but all other transition probabilities have
to be taken into account, too.
This is easily generalized to arbitrary k: for a low
but fixed  and sufficiently large N , the stationary
probability distribution assigns almost all mass to C
for a < mini=1,...,k max{ i−1k , 1 − ik} and to D other-
wise.
2. Snowdrift game
The replicator dynamics admits a single stable equi-
librium where cooperators and defectors co-exist in
the Snowdrift game, Eq. (13). The equilibrium frac-
tion of cooperators depends on the sampling scheme
and is lower (or disappears) if competitors also inter-
act, c.f. Eq. (14) and Fig. 2. However, in finite pop-
ulations, stochastic fluctuations inevitably drive the
population to either one of the homogeneous states,
which are absorbing in the absence of mutations. In
the Snowdrift game, absorption times scale exponen-
tially with population size N [43]. Thus, for small mu-
tation rates, µ, the splitting of the probability mass of
the stationary distribution between the two homoge-
neous states and the co-existence state is non-trivial
but remains accessible for stochastic stability.
Theorem 2 In Snowdrift games, Eq. (13), the homo-
geneous state with all defectors, D, is stochastically
stable under random matching if
r > (k − 1)/(k + 1),
while for r < (k−1)/(k+1), the stationary distribution
assigns non-zero probability to interior states.
The proof is provided in appendix C. Interestingly
this implies that C is never stochastically stable. For
k = 4, it follows that D is stochastically stable for
r > 3/5, see Fig. 6b. The discontinuous jumps in
the frequency of cooperators can be associated with
thresholds of r that ensure that C-players outcom-
pete D-players in relevant configurations. Naturally,
which configurations are relevant depends on the fre-
quency of cooperators. For example, if cooperators
are rare, most likely neither C-players nor D-players
interact with another C and thus their respective pay-
offs are k(b − c) and b (recall that by default com-
petitors also interact in random matching models).
The C-players win if r < (k − 1)/(k + 1), which cor-
responds to the stochastic stability threshold above
which the homogeneous D state is stable. At slightly
higher frequencies of cooperators both C-players and
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FIG. 5. Stochastic stability in the Stag-hunt game for
random matching in finite populations (N = 100) for a
standard sampling and b modified sampling (focal and
model individuals always interact) with k = 4 interaction
partners and  = 0.001 as a function of the payoff for a
hare, a, see Eq. (15) (•, mean of stationary distribution
with standard deviation as error bars). a for standard
sampling, the risk dominant strategy is stochastically sta-
ble: for a < 1/2 cooperation is risk dominant whereas for
a > 1/2 defection is risk dominant. b In contrast, for
the modified sampling, cooperation is stochastically sta-
ble only for a < 1/4, whereas defection remains the only
stable state for a > 1/2. However, for 1/4 < a < 1/2 both
homogeneous states are stochastically stable and attract
the same probability mass, which results in a mean of 1/2.
their competing D-players are both likely to inter-
act with one randomly chosen C-player, which yields
b−c/2+(k−1)(b−c) for the C-player and 2b for the D-
player. Thus, the C-player wins if r < (k−2)/(k+1).
For still higher frequencies of cooperators, both com-
petitors likely interact with two random C-players,
which translates into a thresholds of r < (k−3)/(k+1)
for cooperators to win. Thus we expect k−1 transition
points where the stochastic sampling of interaction
partners favours and reinforces particular frequencies
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FIG. 6. Stochastic stability in the Snowdrift game for ran-
dom matching in finite populations (N = 100) for a stan-
dard sampling and b modified sampling (focal and model
individuals always interact) with k = 4 interaction part-
ners and  = 0.001 as a function of the cost-to-benefit-
ratio, r, see Eq. (13) (•, mean of stationary distribution
with standard deviation as error bars). a for standard
sampling the interior equilibrium x∗ is always stochasti-
cally stable. Note, x∗ coincides with the homogeneous
equilibria for r = 0 and r = 1. b In contrast, for the
modified sampling, defection is stochastically stable for
r > 3/5, whereas the interior equilibrium remains stable
for r < 3/5.
of cooperators and relates to the three jumps observed
for k = 4 in Fig. 6b at r ≈ 0.2, 0.4, 0.6. The above ar-
gument also suggests that the plateaus should occur in
increments of 1/k, which also matches Fig. 6b but nat-
urally the plateaus are less pronounced for frequencies
around 50% because many other types of matchings
are likely and introduce further and finer grains of
thresholds.
In a random matching model with standard sam-
pling, i.e. in the case where focal and model individ-
uals do not necessarily interact, the results are again
quite different. In fact, for 0 < r < 1 neither the ho-
mogeneous C nor D state is stochastically stable and
effectively all probability mass is assigned to interior
states. The Snowdrift game favours rare types, which
means that the transitions 1→ 2 and N−1→ N−2 of
the number of C-players are highly likely regardless of
r. More precisely, a single C-player in the population
gets a payoff of k(b − c)and, in the worst case, com-
petes with a D-player who also happened to interact
with the C and thus has a payoff of b. Consequently
the C-player loses if r > (k − 1)/(k + 1). However,
this scenario occurs only with a probability of the or-
der of 1/N and for smaller r or other matchings the
C-player always wins. Conversely, a single D-player
in the population wins with certainty regardless of r:
even in the worst case the D-player gets a payoff of k ·b
and outcompetes C-players with a payoff of k(b − c)
from interactions with other C’s. As a consequence,
although D remains stochastically stable, for fixed 
and large N , the stationary probability assigns almost
all probability mass to interior states, Fig. 6a.
The frequency of cooperators again exhibits discon-
tinuous jumps that relate to thresholds of r, which en-
ables cooperators to outcompete defectors in relevant
configurations. Naturally, both the thresholds and
the levels of the plateaus are different because com-
peting C-players and D-players no longer necessarily
interact. If both interact with one C-player they get
b−c/2+(k−1)(b−c) and b, respectively, such that C-
players win if r < (k−1)/k. Similarly, if both interact
with two C-players, the C-player wins if r < (k−2)/k.
Thus, we again expect k − 1 transition points that
favour certain frequencies of cooperators and are ob-
served for k = 4 in Fig. 6a at r ≈ 0.25, 0.5, 0.75. In
contrast to Fig. 6b the increment between plateau lev-
els seems closer to 1/(k + 1) but such differences are
not surprising because these levels are the result of dy-
namical feedback between sampling probabilities and
transition probabilities.
IV. DISCUSSION
For modelling evolutionary trajectories, the sam-
pling process, which determines the interaction part-
ners and hence the fitness of competing individuals,
has a decisive impact on the evolutionary outcome.
Naturally, the sampling is affected by the structure of
the population (or lack thereof) but another crucial
aspect is whether or not competing individuals also
interact.
In a microscopic interpretation of the canonical dy-
namics of evolutionary game theory, the replicator
equation [19], interaction partners are randomly sam-
pled and competing individuals do not interact. More
precisely, in unstructured finite populations of size N
the chance that the focal individual and its competi-
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tor interact is of order 1/N and hence vanishes in the
infinite population limit of the replicator dynamics.
Modifying the sampling scheme to always include in-
teractions between competitors changes the dynam-
ics quantitatively and, at times, even qualitatively in
co-existence and coordination games. In social dilem-
mas, the modified sampling scheme invariably favours
defectors. While this merely speeds up the demise of
cooperators in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, it shifts the in-
terior equilibrium in the Snowdrift game and reduces
the equilibrium fraction of cooperators and similarly
increases the basin of attraction of defectors in the
Stag-hunt game. In the latter two cases the change in
sampling may even eliminate the interior fixed point
altogether turning defection into a dominant strategy,
just as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In particular, if
individuals exclusively interact with their competitor,
neither co-existence nor bi-stability is possible and one
type invariably dominates the other.
In social dilemmas, assortment promotes cooper-
ation by reducing exploitation by defectors, for ex-
ample, through cluster formation in structured pop-
ulations. However, this effect is reduced if com-
petitors also interact, which is the case in tradi-
tional models with identical interaction and repro-
duction graphs [13, 17, 26] (some notable exceptions
are [39, 44, 45]). Even if interaction partners are
randomly sampled from an individual’s limited local
neighbourhood, chances are high that this includes
any neighbour who is challenging the focal individual.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma the benefits of cluster
formation tend to prevail and spatial structure is ca-
pable of supporting cooperation [26]. This also applies
to the spatial Moran process except in the weak selec-
tion limit of birth-death updating where the benefits
of assortment are cancelled by competing with inter-
action partners [13, 39]. In the Stag-hunt game spatial
structure in general simply favours the risk-dominant
strategy [30] but adding noise can result in surprising
qualitative changes [46]. Interestingly, the situation is
more subtle for the spatial Snowdrift game [17] and
depends on the reference scenario. When compared
to the replicator dynamics, the effects of space can in-
hibit or enhance cooperation depending on the game
parameters. However, when compared to the equi-
librium fraction of cooperators for the replicator dy-
namics with modified sampling, then spatial structure
again has an invariably beneficial impact on coopera-
tion also in the Snowdrift game.
Random matching models provide another interest-
ing alternative to identify and quantify effects of pop-
ulation structure because they assume an underlying
population structure but then randomly reshuffle in-
dividuals between updates to prevent spatial correla-
tions. Thus the default sampling of interaction part-
ners includes competitors for random matching but
of course the sampling scheme can easily be adjusted
to reflect the standard sampling of the replicator dy-
namics. In the limit of infinite populations, random
matching recovers the long-term dynamics of the repli-
cator equation for both sampling types. In finite pop-
ulations the evolutionary outcome is determined by
stochastic stability, which identifies all states of the
population with a non-zero allocation of probability
mass in the zero-noise limit. The results agree well
with the expectations based on the replicator equation
with modified or standard sampling. Interestingly,
however, confirming stochastic stability through sim-
ulations and numerical analysis turns out to be sur-
prisingly challenging, which highlights that this zero-
noise limit is fickle and may be of limited relevance
for modelling purposes.
The differences in the dynamics based on whether
interactions include competitors is mirrored in the dif-
ferences between birth-death and death-birth updat-
ing in the spatial Moran process [13, 39]. For exam-
ple, in the weak-selection limit, death-birth updating
can sustain cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma if
b > c ·k, while birth-death updating cannot. The rea-
son for this difference is that for death-birth updat-
ing, neighbours of a vacant site compete to repopulate
the vacancy but neighbours tend not to be neighbours
themselves and hence tend not to interact with each
other. Conversely, for birth-death updating, all in-
dividuals compete for reproduction and, in particu-
lar, each individual also competes with its interaction
partners and consequently, cooperators provide direct
support to competitors at a disadvantage to them-
selves.
The upshot is that for the success of cooperation
it is crucial that individuals carefully sample their in-
teraction partners not only to reduce exploitation by
defectors but also to avoid interactions with competi-
tors.
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Appendix A: Stationary probability distributions
of ergodic Markov chains
We assume that the system follows some determin-
istic rule with the probability 1− and with the prob-
ability , a mistake is made that moves the system in
the other direction.
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Let (Ω, P) be a discrete-time Markov chain with a
finite state space Ω and transition probabilities given
by P : Ω × Ω → [0, 1]. We assume that one can
get with non-zero probability from any state to any
other state in a finite number of steps. It follows that
the Markov chain has the unique stationary probabil-
ity distribution µ. We say that the state x ∈ Ω is
stochastically stable if it has a non-zero probability in
the stationary probability distribution, that is
lim
→0
µ(x) > 0. (A1)
It means that the state x is observed in the long run
with a non-zero frequency. We are usually interested
in situations where this frequency is equal to 1.
For x ∈ Ω, an x-tree with the root at x is a directed
graph on Ω (connecting all vertices) such that from
every y 6= x there is a unique path to x and there are
no outgoing edges out of x. Denote by T (x) the set of
all x-trees and let
q(x) =
∑
d∈T (x)
∏
(y,y′)∈d
P(y, y
′), (A2)
where P(y, y
′) is the element of the transition matrix
(that is, a conditional probability that the system will
be at the state y′ at time t provided it was at the state
y at time t−1) and the above product is with respect
to all edges of the x-tree d. In our finite population
models, P(y, y
′) is a polynomial in 1 −  and  or it
is equal to 0.
Now one can show that (the Tree Lemma) [47, 48]
µ(x) =
q(x)∑
y∈Ω q(y)
(A3)
for all x ∈ Ω.
A state is absorbing if it attracts nearby states in
the zero-noise (no mistakes) dynamics ( = 0). That is
after a finite number of steps of the zero-noise dynam-
ics, the system arrives at one of the absorbing states
and stays there forever. It follows from Eq. (A3) that
the stationary probability distribution can be written
as the ratio of two polynomials in . Hence any non-
absorbing state has zero probability in the stationary
distribution in the zero-noise limit (→ 0). Moreover,
in order to study the zero-noise limit of the stationary
distribution, it is enough to consider paths between
absorbing states. Let us assume that the system has
two absorbing states. Let mxy be a minimal num-
ber of mistakes needed to make a transition from the
state x to y and myx the minimal number of mistakes
to make a transition from y to x. Then q(x) is of the
order myx and q(y) is of the order 
mxy . If for exam-
ple, myx < mxy, then it follows that lim→0 µ(x) = 1,
hence x is stochastically stable.
In one-dimensional models considered here (biased
random walk on N + 1 integers with absorbing states
at 0 and N), the situation is much simpler – all states
have unique trees and the only absorbing states are 0
and N . The unique tree of an absorbing state is given
by a direct path from the other absorbing state, while
for any interior state, its tree is made of two directed
paths from 0 and N .
Appendix B: Stochastic stability in the Stag-hunt
game - Proof of Theorem 1
First we find the threshold for the extinction for
D, that is the biggest a such that C is stochastically
stable. The best scenario for C, for transitions i →
i + 1, i = 1, ..., k, is that a model C-player interacts
with i− 1 C-players and one D-player. Then for a <
(i−1)/k, 1 < i ≤ k, the transition i→ i+1 takes place
with the probability 1−. For i = N−1, ..., N−k, the
best scenario for D, is that a model C-player interacts
with N − i D-players. Then for a < 1 − i/k, N −
k ≥ i < N , transitions i → i + 1 take place with the
probability 1−. For both inequalities for a to hold we
take a minimum value of two bounds, min{ i−1k , 1− ik}.
To get a threshold for the extinction of D we take a
maximum value of the above expression with respect
to i = 1, ..., k.
Now we find the threshold for the extinction for C,
that is the smallest a such that D is stochastically
stable. If a > (i − 1)/k, 1 < i ≤ k, then even for the
best scenario for C, transitions i → i + 1 take place
with the probability 1− . For a > 1− i/k, N − k ≥
i < N , for the best scenario for D transitions i →
i− 1 takes place with the probability 1− . For both
inequalities for a to hold we take a maximum value of
two bounds, max{ i−1k , 1− ik}. To get a threshold for
the extinction of C we take a minimum value of the
above expression with respect to i = 1, ..., k.
Appendix C: Stochastic stability in the Snowdrift
game - Proof of Theorem 2
For z = N − 1, the payoff of the only D-player
is bigger than the payoff of any C-player. Therefore
the population moves from z = N − 1 to z = N − 2
with probability 1 − . If k(b − c) < b, that is
r > (k − 1)/(k + 1), then the payoff of a single C-
player is smaller than the payoff of any D-player and
therefore, the population moves from z = 1 to z = 0
with probability 1 − . Hence the tree of z = 0 is of
order  and both z = N and z = x∗ have trees of order
3. It follows from the Tree lemma (see appendix A)
that the homogeneous population with all defectors is
stochastically stable.
Conversely, for r < (k − 1)/(k + 1), all three states
z = 0, z = N , and z = x∗, have trees of order 2.
It follows that in the zero-noise limit, the stationary
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distribution assigns non-zero probability to interior states with C and D strategies co-existing.
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